Thursday, August 27, 2020

Shamanism: The Siberian Paradigm in the Analysis of Shamans Essay

Shamanism: The Siberian Paradigm in the Analysis of Shamans THE ANALYS OF THE SHAMAN: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION Lord Louis IX of France, an ardent Roman Catholic who is loved as holy person and praiseworthy Christian ruler, got a nerve racking report from a Franciscan priest in 1255. The Monk Wilhelm av Ruysbroek, who had been sent to the court of Mongolia for France, retold the record of a prophet that summoned spirits with magic and took care of a malicious murkiness with drum music and bubbled meat. Researchers presently understand that this record depicts the principal experience a Westerner experienced with shamanistic ceremonies (Siikala, A.L. and Hoppã ¡l, M. 1998). All the more critically, in spite of his emotional depiction, the French Monk presented the idea of the shaman toward the West. Through numerous ensuing onlooker reports, it would be seen that the job of the shaman has remained generally unaltered from century to century. The shaman, as a profound strict authority, is currently the focal point of much Western grant with research dissecting the job of this person inside the shamanistic frameworks of conviction. However, it is inside this investigation that the researcher of shamanism must get familiar with the qualities of the shaman through the assortment and examination of essential information so as to appropriately mediate set up ends to the control. These ends ought to present unique cases inside the field, for example, shaman recognizable proof rules, definite examination techniques, and deconstructions of group explicit shamanic history. All the more critically, the information being broke down must begin from direct records of shamans and their extraordinary excursions, formal customs, and particular gear. The point of this exploration piece is... ...ifferent universes and collaboration with absurd creatures is compared with a reliance to a participatory network. At long last grant is given a comprehension of the shaman that is accord with the truth of the social conditions. References Eliade, M. (2005). In L. Jones (Ed.), Encyclopedia of religion (second ed. ed., pp. 8269-8274). Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. Pharo, L. K. (2011). A system for a deconstruction and recreation of the ideas â€Å"Shaman† and â€Å"Shamanism†. Numen: International Review for the History of Religions, 58 Sidky, H. (2010). Ethnographic points of view on separating shamans from other ceremonial mediators. Asian Ethnology, 69(2), (pp. 213-240). Siikala, A.L. and Hoppã ¡l, M. (1998). Studies on shamanism. Helsinki: Finish Anthropological Society. Stutley, M. (2003). Shamanism: A presentation. London: Routledge.

Saturday, August 22, 2020

Canada and Chemical Weapons :: Canadian Canada History

Canada and Chemical Weapons Substance weapons go back the Peloponnesian war of 428-424 BC when they were utilized against the Spartans; the synthetic concoctions utilized were ignitable gadgets and sulfur-based gases that were passed up the breeze onto assaulted urban communities. The concoction weapons utilized at that point aren't close to as destructive as those utilized in later occasions, for example, mustard gas, they were more to cause there foes to withdraw. There have been numerous episodes in history in which substance weapons have been utilized as I have found in two articles on the historical backdrop of compound weapons. The articles I discovered are A Short History of Chemical Weapons, and Making the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War. Substance weapons have been utilized in numerous events in war, including Ancient Times, The Middle Ages, World War I, and World War II, etc all through time. Numerous sorts of substance weapons have been utilized yet current synthetic weapons began on April 22, 1915, with the Germans utilization of Chlorine gas on the Allie troops in WWI. In this occurrence 6,000 chambers of the gas were discharged by 2 legions along a 6 kilometer of the front, and the breeze scattered the billows of gas slaughtering 5,000 fighters and putting 1,500 progressively out of the war. This caused extraordinary frenzy since not at all like this had occurred previously and wasn't normal by the partners. Past to this occasion in the Middle Ages they utilized such things as arsenic and increasingly regular things as synthetic substances which were as incredible as the chlorine gas wound up being in WWI. Concoction weapons were utilized ordinarily after the Germans utilized chlorine gas in WWI, chlorine, phosg ene, benzyl bromide, hydrogen cyanide, and afterward mustard gas in 1917. Mustard gas turned into the most noticeably terrible and most famous compound weapon utilized when it came out due to the fact that it was so hurtful to the foes; what's more it was calculated that 1,300,000 troopers were murdered by the concoction weapons before the finish of WWI. This article expressed that: If the main World War had proceeded for one more year it would undoubtedly have been known as the principal Chemical War (A Short History of Chemical Weapons) In WWII the utilization of concoction weapons diminished a great deal and was just utilized in the Far East. Since WWI has truly been known as the origin of concoction weapons Tim Cook begins his article there with the Germans utilization of chlorine gas and how synthetic weapon use raised starting there.

Friday, August 21, 2020

How Your Blog Can Benefit From The Growing Mobile Marketing Trend

How Your Blog Can Benefit From The Growing Mobile Marketing Trend Make Money Online Queries? Struggling To Get Traffic To Your Blog? Sign Up On (HBB) Forum Now!How Your Blog Can Benefit From The Growing Mobile Marketing TrendUpdated On 23/04/2017Author : Bamidele OnibalusiTopic : BloggingShort URL : http://bit.ly/2ozkbJI CONNECT WITH HBB ON SOCIAL MEDIA Follow @HellBoundBlogAccording to recent data from Google, more than 44% of the entire US population now owns a Smartphone and 66% of these Smartphone owners access the Internet with their Smartphone every day.Furthermore, 80% of these Smartphone users never leave home without their Smartphone. Also, it was revealed that 94% of Smartphone users look for local information on their Smartphone and 90% of them take action as a result.In other words, Smartphones are now an indispensable part of our day-to-day lives.While the above data are mainstream marketing stats, the reality is that you can still benefit as a blogger.Just as in their homes, most people have high speed internet access on their phone s and as a result not only use it for phone calls, but also to catch up with latest trends, interesting videos, their favorite blogs as well as making purchases online.The question is how do you benefit from this as a blogger? The answer: by optimizing your blog for mobile users.A few popular bloggers are now starting to capitalize on the indispensability of Smartphones in our daily lives and a great example is Neil Patel, who was able to increase mobile traffic by more than 100% in just 2 months.Here are a few ways every blogger can benefit from the growing popularity of mobile devices.1. Create a Mobile WebsiteA recent survey from Google observed that 75% of those who were surveyed prefer a mobile-friendly website over a non-mobile friendly website and this only makes sense when we consider how widespread mobile devices are. In other words, this isn’t surprising at all.What is most surprising, however, is the reaction more than half of those who were surveyed had for websites th at are not mobile-compatible. 48% of the people surveyed said that they are frustrated and annoyed when they visit a site that is not mobile friendly.In other words, just by not having a mobile website you could be irritating a large portion of your website visitors.There are two ways to go about creating a mobile version of your blog:Create a special site mobile users can visitUse an application that automatically turns your website into a mobile site when it is visited by mobile usersThe first one is the most optimal since there could be issues automatically showing a mobile version of your website to Desktop users should you decide to go with option #2; going for option #1 could create duplicate content issues with search engines, however, since there are two different versions of your site with the same content.An idea is to go with option 1 and make the mobile version of your blog “no-index”; you can then automatically redirect visits from mobile users who visit the main bl og directly, that find you via other sources, to the mobile site. At the same time, you can include an option to automatically switch to a mobile site or to the main site depending on how your blog is accessed.READGuest Blogging: So Why Should You Care?If you use WordPress, there are dozens of plugins in the WordPress plugin repository that can be used to create a mobile version of your website.One of the most popular plugins that does this is WP Touch.You can also create a fancy mobile version of your blog with the Duda mobile app.2. Create a Mobile AppAnother option is to create a mobile app for your blog; this way, without having to visit your website, people will have all your content on their mobile device. It could be on their iPhone or Android phone, having a mobile app will give you numerous advantages.One major advantage, for example, is that you can benefit from exposure in the app directory of the mobile app store where your app is listed.3. Create Special Resources for M obile Readers to Draw People InAnother way to benefit is by creating special resources for mobile users; this could be a kind of guide, a special article, a special video or anything exclusive to people who decide to visit your mobile website or install your mobile app.By doing this you’ll be able to get more people to use the mobile version of your website, increase your rankings in the app directory and get more exposure for your blog.4. Make Provisions for Mobile Payment on Your BlogThis is especially important if you sell anything on your website.Data from a recent Google survey revealed that 67% of those who were surveyed are more likely to buy from a website that is mobile friendly compared to a website that is not; in other words, even if you sell eBooks on your blog or if you have your own course, a percentage of your subscribers will only be willing to pay through their mobile phones. If you don’t make provisions for these people, then you’re missing out and with arou nd 100 million people in the US accessing the internet from their Smartphones daily… that is no small number.With several quality mobile payment processors like Square, Intuit Gopayments and Pay Anywhere, you can start accepting mobile payments on your blog.5. Use a Responsive DesignBuilding a mobile app can be expensive and it isn’t uncommon to build a mobile site only to discover there are bugs on some devices.There are thousands of different Smartphones people can use to access your blog with countless operating systems; no matter how perfect your mobile design is, it’ll be difficult to get it to look as well as you want it to look on all these devices.Another way to go about this is to use a responsive blog design; a responsive design automatically adapts to the device accessing your website. In other words, whether your blog is being accessed with an Android phone, an iPhone, a tablet computer or a laptop, it’ll automatically adjust to each device and still look great, as if it was designed for just that device.

Monday, May 25, 2020

Useful Mobile Apps for MBA Students

This list of useful mobile apps for MBA students will help you create schedules, collaborate, network, improve productivity, and make the most of the MBA experience. iStudiez Pro iStudiez Pro is an award-winning multiplatform student planner that can be used to track class schedules, homework assignments, tasks, grades, and more. The app will notify you about important tasks and events so that you can get organized and stay on top of important deadlines and meetings. The iStudiez Pro app also offers two-way integration with Google Calendar and other calendar apps so that you can share schedules with classmates, members of your study group, or people in your social circle. Free cloud sync is available as well, making it easy to wirelessly sync app data across multiple devices. The iStudiez Pro app is available for: iOSmacOSAndroidWindows *Note: If you would like to try this app before you purchase it, a free version of the app, known as iStudiez LITE, is available through the App Store for iOS devices. Trello Millions of people - from small start-up businesses to Fortune 500 companies - use the Trello app to collaborate on team projects. This app works well for MBA cohorts and study groups who are collaborating on a project for a class or competition. Trello is like a real-time, virtual whiteboard that everyone on the team has access to. It can be used to create checklists, share files, and have discussions about project details. Trello can be synced across all devices and works with all major browsers so that you can access the app data wherever you are. The free version would work for most student groups and teams, but there is also a paid version for users who want special features, such as extra storage space or the ability to integrate data with an unlimited number of apps.   The Trello app is available for: iOSmacOSAndroidWindows Shapr Shapr is a professional networking app that is designed to make the entire process of networking less painful and time consuming. Unlike most networking apps, Shapr uses an algorithm that considers your tagged interests and location to connect you with like-minded professionals who are in your area and looking to network. As with the Tinder or Grindr dating apps, Shapr allows you to swipe right anonymously. The app will notify you when the interest is mutual so that you don’t have to deal with random, unsolicited requests to talk or meet up. Another plus is that Shapr presents you with 10 to 15 different profiles each day; if you don’t feel like you can connect with the people it shows you one day, there will be a fresh crop of options the following day. The Shapr app is available for: iOSAndroid Forest The Forest app is a useful mobile app for people who are easily distracted by their phone when they should be studying, working, or doing something else. When you want to focus on something, you open the app and plant a virtual tree. If you close the app and use your phone for something else, the tree will die. If you stay off your phone for the designated amount of time, the tree will live and become part of a virtual forest. But it isnt just a virtual tree at stake. When you stay off your phone, you also earn credits. These credits can then be spent on real trees that are planted by a real tree planting organization that has teamed up with the makers of the Forest app. The Forest app is available for: iOSAndroid Mindfulness The Mindfulness app is a useful mobile app for MBA students who are feeling overwhelmed or stressed out over school obligations. This app is designed to help people manage their mental health and well being through meditation. With the Mindfulness app, you can create timed meditation sessions that are as short as three minutes long or as lengthy as 30 minutes long. The app also includes nature sounds and a  dashboard that displays your meditation statistics. You can get the free version of Mindfulness or you can pay for a subscription to get additional features like  themed meditations (calm, focus, inner strength, etc.)  and access to meditation courses.   The Mindfulness app is available for: iOSAndroid

Thursday, May 14, 2020

Why Did Judge Hall Choose John Jameson for Celia’s...

Why did Judge Hall choose John Jameson for Celia’s defense? Given the impact of the slavery issue upon Missouri’s politics at the time, the Judge Hall hoped for the trail to be conducted as expeditiously and decorously as possible, in a manner that ran the least risk of arousing the ire of either camp. Judge Hall needed a capable attorney, one of considerable standing in the community. He needed an attorney with proven political sensibilities, one who had not participated significantly in the slavery debates. In short, he needed an attorney who could be depended upon to give Celia a credible defense, one whose presence would make it difficult for slavery’s critics to label the trial a farce or sham and one who would not arouse the†¦show more content†¦Hardly more than a month following Lincolns victory came declarations of secession by South Carolina and other states, which were rejected as illegal by outgoing President James Buchanan and President-elect Lincoln. The election of Lincoln in November 1860 was the final trigger for secession.[74] Efforts at compromise, including the Corwin Amendment and the Crittenden Compromise, failed. Southern leaders feared that Lincoln would stop the expansion of slavery and put it on a course toward extinction. The slave states, which had already become a minority in the House of Representatives, were now facing a future as a perpetual minority in the Senate and Electoral College against an increasingly powerful North. Before Lincoln took office in March 1861, seven slave states had declared their secession and joined together to form the Confederacy. 1. West expansion 2. State rights 3. Economics 4. Irrepressible conflict 5. Slavery Causes of secession The Abolitionist movement in the United States had roots in the Declaration of Independence. Slavery was banned in the Northwest Territory with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. By 1804 all the Northern states had passed laws to gradually abolish slavery. Congress banned the African slave-trade in 1808, although slavery grew in new states in the deep south. The Union was divided along

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Analysis Of August Wilson s Fences - 1840 Words

In today s society people have to deal with several issues that we can t explain. For some of us we built fences to isolate ourselves from others or in some cases to protect ourselves. No matter what the issue is we, all have to struggle to be able to provide for our families. As a child I built fences when it came to my feelings. For example, growing up I was in the chunky side. Since I wasnt so skinny like the pretty girls in my class. I kinda isolated my self from the other students. That way my feelings wouldn t get hurt. My fence was to protect me from what I thought was going to hurt me. Well the same thing happened to Troy Maxson. In the play, Fences written by the well-known playwright, August Wilson, is the story of Troy Maxson and his beloved family. Throughout the whole entire play, a fence is being built around the Maxson household. As the story unfolds to the viewers, the word fences may look like a simple title, but the truth is it has different symbolic meaning. The r eal definition of the word fence is revealed along with the personalities of the characters in the play. In Fences, August Wilson uses different types of fences as a metaphor to explain how these people live. Our play takes place during the year 1957. During the mid-1950s, America was still experiencing a post-World War II, economic boom, and of course allowing foreign affairs to take action when dealing with domestic issues. According to PBS channel during the year 1954 the SupremeShow MoreRelatedAnalysis Of August Wilson s Fence 1146 Words   |  5 PagesLong Eng 200 August 13,2017 The play â€Å"Fence† by August Wilson’s has a connection with real world fence. â€Å"The yard is a small dirt yard, partially fenced, except for the last scene, with a wooden sawhorse, a pile of lumber, and other fence-building equipment set off to the side. The Opposite is a tree from which hangs a ball made of rags. A baseball bat leans against the tree. Two oil drums serve as garbage receptacles and sit near the house at right to complete the setting† (Wilson 2). He mentionsRead MoreAnalysis Of August Wilson s Fences1609 Words   |  7 PagesIn 1965, August Wilson’s â€Å"Fences† was created as the fifth part of his Pittsburg Cycle of dramas of the 20th Century investigation of the evolution of black culture. The play has an abundance of symbolism and metaphors that tells the late life story of Troy Maxon and the family that surrounds him. Even from the beginning of the drama there is conflict and foreshadowing that can be attributed to his ow n belief that he has failed in life and that the world did not give him what he deserved. He takesRead MoreAnalysis Of August Wilson s Fences 970 Words   |  4 PagesWe sometimes believe that by creating barriers around ourselves and the people we love, it will keep us safe and together. August Wilson is an African-American playwright from Pittsburg, Pennsylvania who was raised with his five brothers and sisters by his mother who worked hard to support them after his father, a white man left them. His mother found another man who also helped her raise them. In this time, it was very hard for African-Americans because it was the time when White Americans and AfricanRead MoreAn Analysis Of Henrik Ibsen s A Doll House And August Wilson Fences 1224 Words   |  5 PagesTwo Women and Their Breaking Points Taking a glance at the work of Henrik Ibsen â€Å"A Doll House† and August Wilson â€Å"Fences†, readers would believe that the writer’s characters Rose and Nora could not be any more different from one another. But, as one would exceed deeper into the critical themes of the characters and of the two plays, the similarities can be drawn. The two women share more in common than ones may think, in terms of their characterization. In the play â€Å"A Doll House† the main characterRead MoreSymbolism In Fences By August Wilson1460 Words   |  6 PagesKeep Love in or Lock it Out?: An Analysis of Symbolism in Fences Symbolism is defined as an artistic and poetic movement or style using symbolic images and indirect suggestion to express mystical ideas, emotions, and states of mind. In Fences by August Wilson, symbolism is used heavily throughout the play in order to represent deeper meanings and add to the emotion of the storyline. In order for the play to have so much depth and emotion, symbolism is crucial to the work itself and the heavy topicsRead MoreNotes On The Novel Fences And Pied Piper Of Tucson 1080 Words   |  5 PagesYou Been?† and Mara Bovsun’s article, â€Å"Pied Piper of Tucson;† they identify and describe ways authors ‘hook and hold’ readers with specific choices. Next, students read the play Fences by Pulitzer Prize winner August Wilson and analyze the role of stories within in the story to create tension and advance the plot. Fences is the foundation for the unit’s cornerstone task: after ranking and discussing important lines in the play, student perform them, and reflect on the impact of the important linesRead MoreFences Research1694 Words   |  7 PagesBoundaries in August Wilson’s Fences The early 1950’s was a time of enormous importance because of the Civil Rights Movement which emphasized equal rights for blacks and whites. According to the book Approaching Literature, this time period became very familiar to August Wilson, the author of the play Fences. Wilson, an African American man, was raised by his mother and his ex-convict father. For a short period of time, before moving back to his old neighborhood, Wilson lived in a primarilyRead MoreSocial, Political, And Family Issues On August Wilson s Fences1596 Words   |  7 PagesSocial, Political, and Family Issues in August Wilson’s Fences August Wilson’s Fences depicts life in the 1950s for a typical African American family. The play touches upon racism, shifting family dynamics, and the politics of war. While racism plays an important and vital role in the play, instead of lamenting the issue, Wilson uses the characters as a weapon against the rampant racism of the time. In the same fashion, the relationship between Troy, Rose, and Cory demonstrates the shifting culturalRead MoreFences: White People and Troy Essay1719 Words   |  7 PagesAnalysis of â€Å"Fences† August Wilson’s famous play â€Å"Fences† is a drama set in the 1950’s. Being a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for the best play of the year, this play has had many positive responses to blacks and whites in this society. It is about protagonist Troy Maxson as well as his african american family that is filled with drama and excitement. In Wilson’s Fences by Joseph Wessling he expresses, â€Å"Fences is about the always imperfect quest for true manhood. Troy’s father was less of a â€Å"true†Read MoreThe Rise And Fall Of Troy Maxon1278 Words   |  6 PagesFall of Troy Maxon: An Analysis of August Wilson’s play Fences In Fences, August Wilson, the playwright, provides a believable and powerful examination of the African American experience in the late 1950’s. It provides an apt portrayal of the mentality of African American men going into the civil rights movement, as well as a well-developed account of the friction that occurs between a father and a son, and a husband and wife in the face of conflict. According to Wilson, his play provides Caucasians

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Benefits a Family Strengths Assessment for Family-myassignmenthelp

Question: Write about theBenefits a Family Strengths Assessment for Family. Answer: Australian Family Strengths Nursing Assessment Guide contains nine components which are: affection, acceptance, togetherness, support, communication, commitment, resilience, sharing activities and spiritual well-being (Smith Ford 2013, Table 5.1, pp. 101-102); also, depends on the qualities based care idea where the nurse enables the patient and family to get solutions (Gottlieb 2013). The Australian Family Strengths Nursing Assessment Guide (AFSNAG) is useful in that it allows the medical attendant to animate a discussion with the patient and family over each of the segments (Smith and Ford 2013). Each of the characteristics of family qualities gives the nurse who is directing the evaluation with a more clear comprehension of the way a family works (Smith and Ford 2013); it reveals how a wellbeing condition is influencing the distinctive relatives and features their individual needs (Smith and Ford 2013). Albeit every family is novel and has their particular traditions, qualities and convictions, the AFSNA questions have been skillfully created and are open-ended; they are composed in a way that incorporates the entire family (Smith and Ford 2013). For instance, 'When does the family get to know each other?' (Smith and Ford 2013, pp. 101) or, 'What diverse obligations do each of you have?' (Smith and Ford 2013, pp. 101). It enables the relatives to recount their story in their own particular words and the way they see things. A huge advantage of the inquiries is that they can be adjusted to suit the conditions of the patient or potentially their family (Power, 2003). Every individual is influenced by a circumstance unexpectedly, especially when an impromptu emergency happens that they are not ready. From listening to the family's story, the nurse acquires a superior knowledge into the household and can watch how each of the relatives adapts (Gottlieb 2013). Recognizing the family's qualities and seeing how the family adapts is worthwhile to both the medical attendant and the family since changes in the way the family capacities can be started to expand their versatility (Patterson, referred to in Smith and Ford 2013). Enlisted nurses in Australia who have utilized the AFSNA tool in their clinical practice have lauded it (Smith and Ford 2013, p. 103). One nurse commented that it was 'reviving' to investigate the positive qualities of an individual and additionally their family as opposed to concentrating on the negatives (Smith and Ford 2013, p. 103). The nurse explained more on the advantages of the device expressing that it empowered families to solve problems by building up their qualities and objectives (Barnes et al. (n.d.). After the nurse has finished the appraisal, they can utilize the data accumulated from the patient and family to start setting up a care arrange for that meets the family's specific needs. The family will likewise have profited from being effectively associated with their particular social insurance and have their voices heard. Smith and Ford (2013) see the intelligent discussions between the nurse and the family as used because it advances 'ideal formative wellbeing and prosperity for each other' (Smith and Ford 2013, p. 102). References Barnes, M., Rowe, J., Smith, LM. Ford, K. (n.d.). Family strengths and the Australian Family Strengths Nursing Assessment Guide. Elsevier. Gottlieb, L. (2013). Strengths-based nursing care: health and healing for person and family. New York, Springer Publishing Company. Power, T. J. (2003). Promoting children's health: integrating school, family, and community. New York, Guilford Press. Smith, LM. Ford, K (2013). Conducting a family strengths assessment using the Australian Family Strengths nursing assessment guide. University of Tasmania.

Saturday, April 11, 2020

Chinese Real Estate Market

Correlation to Althusser’s connection to structuralism When examining the illogical nature of China’s construction industry, it bears a great deal of similarity to Althusser’s connection to structuralism wherein he states that there are overarching socio-economic and ideological structures that ultimately have power to determine the other elements of the system, even though these other elements have a fair degree of autonomy.Advertising We will write a custom research paper sample on Chinese Real Estate Market specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More In this particular case, it can clearly be seen that there is an overarching system in the form of the state capitalist based economic model of China that has influenced its government to such an extent that it pursued a path of real estate development that focused on creating high value properties. Since real estate development is normally an independent and autonomous s ystem that is based on consumer demand, the fact that real estate developers in China still adamantly pursues high end development despite lack luster demand is indicative of a structural system in place that dictates their actions. Evidence of this can be seen when examining regional wage developments within China (Sujian, 207-224). It was noted that the average salary of an ordinary Chinese worker is roughly 2,000 to 4,000 Yuan per month, which when converted utilizing the current monetary value of the British pound is equivalent to 190 and 380 pounds respectively or $270 and $520. While the wage can still relatively low, it is still considered by the Chinese government as an adequate level of monetary compensation for a bare minimum standard of living. An examination of average property prices for affordable housing within China done by Bradsher (2013) reveals that the average median home price within the country is equivalent to $114,900 The pricing situation present in Chinaâ⠂¬â„¢s cities is roughly equivalent to average prices within western countries such as the U.S. yet the wage demographics within China is 6 times lower making most housing within the country unattainable by the average worker. What this shows is a failure on the part of a overarching structuralist system that attempted to grow based on a particular predetermined path yet failed spectacularly due to limited vision regarding the ramifications of its actions. China’s Real Estate Market Within the past 2 decades China’s economy has grown to become the second largest economy in the world as a direct result of government initiatives into encouraging foreign direct investment, local entrepreneurship and real estate development (Hui, 951-961).Advertising Looking for research paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Unfortunately, as noted by studies such as â€Å"Study On China Real Estate Price Bub ble: Will It Burst Soon? (2011)†, though there may be a high rate of property development occurring within China’s cities there is an increasingly prevalent rate of housing surplus within the country with well over 70 million surplus housing units expected to reach completion by the end of 2013. As stated by Shen (2009), ordinarily having a certain level of housing surplus would be fine if such housing initiatives were created in order to meet expected demand within the near future, however, Shen (2009) determined that property development within China is not concentrating on either affordable housing or subsidized housing schemes which are in great demand within China. Instead, what is present is a development strategy that is oriented towards high end property development. In fact, studies such as those by Hui (2012) which examined the 70 million housing surplus units within China took note of the fact that most if not all if these units had price schemes that were we ll above what an average Chinese worker would be able to afford. This presents a rather unusual situation since real estate construction within certain areas should reflect consumer demand which is not occurring within this particular case. Instead, what is occurring in the case of China is the complete opposite of what analysts say should be an ideal rate of local real estate development (Shen, 3). Understanding the Chinese Real Estate Market China’s real estate market essentially works under 5 distinct forces that influence the development of its local real estate market. These forces are composed of: the central government, local government, banks, developers and consumers (Bradsher, 2). These particular 5 forces are ubiquitous in real estate markets around the world, yet, what makes the case of China unique is the greater degree of government control over the rate of development (Real Estate Bubbles and the National People’s Congress, 20). This aspect of control wa s seen during the period of 2000 to 2008 where the central government effectively dictated the rate of real estate development within the country instead of allowing natural market forces such as demand and supply to influence the actions of developers (Shen, 18). This particular strategy was noted by Bradsher (2013) as being related to the central government’s desire to meet ever increasing GDP targets and, as such, utilized the real estate market in order to artificially drive up growth. The process of real estate development within China operates under the process of local government officials selling land to developers who build mainly 3 types of housing: subsidized housing for the poor, affordable housing for people with average incomes and high end residential properties (Study On China Real Estate Price Bubble: Will It Burst Soon?, 27).Advertising We will write a custom research paper sample on Chinese Real Estate Market specifically for you for only $16 .05 $11/page Learn More In the case of China, property auctions are often won by developers who chose to build high end properties due to the assumption that the cost of the land can be recouped through selling expensive housing units. It is mentioned by Fung and Yu (2011) in their examination of localized property development that it is not that high end property developers do not win land bids in various international real estate markets but rather it is often the case that high end property developers do not bid as often compared to subsidized housing or affordable housing developers. In the case of China, what is present is a high degree of demand for subsidized or affordable housing with a relatively low degree of demand for high end real estate yet what is present is a situation where there are more high end residential construction projects despite low market demand for that particular type of housing (Sujian, 207-224). Raymond Williams and Hegemony When examin ing the context of Raymond Williams and Hegemony, it can be seen that it is applicable to the case of China wherein an overriding â€Å"world view† or â€Å"class outlook† influences the development of systems of belief within a particular country (Williams 108-114). While China may espouse that its brand of communism is â€Å"for the people† the fact remains that it is the political elite and rich that in effect dictate social and economic development within the region. China’s real estate industry is an excellent example of domination and subordination in action. The rate of development that focuses primarily on high end real estate development in what can only be described as a form of â€Å"tunnel vision† focuses on the development of structures that appeal to the rich and political elite despite the lack of localized demand. As it has been mentioned before, in most systems, supply is meant to meet demand, however, when throwing in the concept of Williams and Hegemony into the mix, what occurs is that despite the lack of demand local corporations continue to supply since the focus is in conforming to the plan of the government for urban development despite the potential negative economic ramifications. This is one of the issues when it comes to state owned developers and hegemony wherein an overriding directive becomes the focus which causes problems for those that are being subordinated yet benefit those who dominate the system.Advertising Looking for research paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More State Influence in Local Real Estate Development As noted by Fung and Yu (2011) in their examination of real estate development within China, it was noted that one unique aspect of the Chinese banking sector was that most banks within China are actually controlled by the state as opposed to the situation in other countries where banks are not directly controlled by the government (Fung, Esther, and Yu, 5). This presents itself as a unique situation as described by the article â€Å"Restless (1998)† since this actually enables the central government to dictate lending rates, who to lend to and for what purpose (Restless, 3). As noted by Fontevecchia (2011), state owned companies tend to receive more preferential treatment from state owned banks (nearly all the banks in China are owned by the government) which in turn enables state owned companies to outbid private developers for land deals. In fact it has been noted by Bradsher (2013) and other similar studies that all around China state run corporations ranging from military, telecom to even oil producers have been venturing into the real estate development industry with which they utilize preferential treatment from banks to overtake private developers in the sheer amount of construction projects created. This has created a situation where multiple state run companies are investing into a platform that simply is not in demand which will result in an eventual catastrophe for the country. Works Cited Bradsher, Keith. â€Å"China’s Central Bank Has Its Own Worries.† New York Times 29 May 2013: B2. Regional Business News. Web. Fontevecchia, Agustino. â€Å"China: When Falling Home Prices Are A Good Thing.† Forbes  (2011): 3. Print Fung, Esther, and Rose Yu. â€Å"Fitch Sees Bank Risks For China.† Wall Street Journal –  Eastern Edition Sept. 2011: C5. Business Source Premier. Web. Hui, Eddie Chi-Man, et al. â€Å"Real Estate Bubbles In China: A Tale Of Two Cities.â₠¬ Ã‚  Construction Management Economics 30.11 (2012): 951-961. Print â€Å"Real Estate Bubbles And The National People’s Congress.† Stratfor Analysis (2010): 20. Print â€Å"Restless.† Business China 24.24 (1998): 3. Business Source Premier. Web. Shen, Irene. â€Å"China’s Premier Pledges To Control Real Estate Bubble, Holds Firm On Yuan.† Businessweek (2009): 18. Print â€Å"Study On China Real Estate Price Bubble: Will It Burst Soon?.† Allied Academies  International Conference: Proceedings Of The Academy For Studies In  International Business (ASIB) 11.1 (2011): 27. Print This research paper on Chinese Real Estate Market was written and submitted by user R0bert to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

Tuesday, March 10, 2020

Expected Value of a Binomial Distribution

Expected Value of a Binomial Distribution Binomial distributions are an important class of discrete probability distributions. These types of distributions are a series of n independent Bernoulli trials, each of which has a constant probability p of success. As with any probability distribution we would like to know what its mean or center is. For this we are really asking, â€Å"What is the expected value of the binomial distribution?† Intuition vs. Proof If we carefully think about a binomial distribution, it is not difficult to determine that the expected value of this type of probability distribution is np. For a few quick examples of this, consider the following: If we toss 100 coins, and X is the number of heads, the expected value of X is 50 (1/2)100.If we are taking a multiple choice test with 20 questions and each question has four choices (only one of which is correct), then guessing randomly would mean that we would only expect to get (1/4)20 5 questions correct. In both of these examples we see that  E[ X ] n p. Two cases is hardly enough to reach a conclusion. Although intuition is a good tool to guide us, it is not enough to form a mathematical argument and to prove that something is true. How do we prove definitively that the expected value of this distribution is indeed np? From the definition of expected value and the probability mass function for the binomial distribution of n trials of probability of success p, we can demonstrate that our intuition matches with the fruits of mathematical rigor. We need to be somewhat careful in our work and nimble in our manipulations of the binomial coefficient that is given by the formula for combinations. We begin by using the formula: E[ X ] ÃŽ £ x0n x C(n, x)px(1-p)n – x. Since each term of the summation is multiplied by x, the value of the term corresponding to x 0 will be 0, and so we can actually write: E[ X ] ÃŽ £ x 1n x C(n , x) p x (1 – p) n – x . By manipulating the factorials involved in the expression for C(n, x) we can rewrite x C(n, x) n C(n – 1, x – 1). This is true because: x C(n, x) x n!/(x!(n – x)!) n!/((x – 1)!(n – x)!) n(n – 1)!/((x – 1)!((n – 1) – (x – 1))!) n C(n – 1, x – 1). It follows that: E[ X ] ÃŽ £ x 1n n C(n – 1, x – 1) p x (1 – p) n – x . We factor out the n and one p from the above expression: E[ X ] np ÃŽ £ x 1n C(n – 1, x – 1) p x – 1 (1 – p) (n – 1) - (x – 1) . A change of variables r x – 1 gives us: E[ X ] np ÃŽ £ r 0n – 1 C(n – 1, r) p r (1 – p) (n – 1) - r . By the binomial formula, (x y)k ÃŽ £ r 0 kC( k, r)xr yk – r the summation above can be rewritten: E[ X ] (np) (p (1 – p))n – 1 np. The above argument has taken us a long way. From beginning only with the definition of expected value and probability mass function for a binomial distribution, we have proved that what our intuition told us. The expected value of the binomial distribution B( n, p) is n p.

Saturday, February 22, 2020

CHROMATOGRAPHY (ANALISIS CHEMISTRY) Coursework Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

CHROMATOGRAPHY (ANALISIS CHEMISTRY) - Coursework Example In thin layer chromatography, a thin, uniform layer of silica or alumina gel was traditionally coated on a piece of glass. The mixture was dissolved in an appropriate solvent and the glass plate was immersed in the liquid. The movement of the individual components of a mixture takes place at different rates and the distance travelled by each component is measured and the data so obtained is used to calculate the Rf value is calculated by dividing the distance travelled by the component with the distance travelled by the solvent. Rf values are then compared with standard values to identify the suspected component. Fluorescent materials are incorporated into the stationary phase to identify colorless components which are invisible to the naked eye. Such components are visualized using ultra violet light. Separation of components of a mixture depends upon their affinity for the solvent as well as the capability of bonding with the stationary phase which is rich in hydroxyl groups. Van d er Waals forces also operate between the components and their affinity or repulsion from the stationary phase and determine the distance moved. Column chromatography was advancement in the technique where the stationary phase was packed inside a column (glass tube) and the mobile phase with the dissolved investigative mixture poured from the top. The movement occurred under the influence of gravity as well as the attraction of the components in the stationary phase, allowing identification of individual components. HPLC (High Performance Liquid Chromatography/High Pressure Liquid Chromatography) is a modern technique used to separate desirable or investigative chemical compounds from other compounds in a liquid sample. The investigative compounds are dissolved in an appropriate organic or inorganic solvent known as the mobile phase and the mixture is passed under pressure through specific columns which constitute the stationary phase.

Thursday, February 6, 2020

Critical Issues in Policing Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Critical Issues in Policing - Essay Example In addition, there are also state police agencies and federal-non-military agencies. This paper looks at various issues affecting policing in the United States. Dangers of Policing Police officers are at serious risk of losing their lives to criminals that are heavily armed. Police officers have encountered dangerous and senseless shootings from criminals. They have been gunned down while investigating cases in the United States. The criminals who possess guns kill the police officers to prevent evidence from being used in a court of law against them. In addition, terror attacks have posed dangers to the police. In particular, the 9/11 terror attacks killed several police officers (Walker and Katz, 2011). Police officers are also vulnerable to vehicle accidents. Police officers use vehicles every day and are therefore vulnerable to traffic accidents. In addition, many police officers have lost their lives in acts of homicide or in the line of duty. Police officers are also at risk of getting infected with dangerous diseases after getting into contact with body fluids of those injured during incidents. During treatment in the event of serious injuries, the officers face the risk of contracting diseases especially if proper screening of blood is not done by medical practitioners (Walker and Katz, 2011). Stress is another danger to the police officers. ... Stress has also been attributed to the increasing level of divorce cases among police officers and their spouses (Walker and Katz, 2011). Less-Than-Lethal Weapons Use of excessive force by the police officers is not allowed by law. In particular, the police officers are not required to use firearms when carrying out their normal duties in the society. Less-than-lethal weapons have been recommended for use instead. The police officers are trained to effectively use â€Å"less-than-lethal weapons† so as to reduce fatalities as they go about their duties. A verbal command is one example of less-than-lethal weapon that police officers are required to use. Suspects are commanded to do what the police officers have told them. Failure to adhere to the police verbal demands lead to another level in the use of justified force (Dempsey and Forst, 2011). Police officers can use batons and beanbags that are aimed at incapacitating a criminal from a distance. These non-lethal weapons have no penetrating contact energy and thus the criminal cannot be grossly harmed by them. The police officers are advised not to aim at the suspect’s head because the effects can be diverse when the batons or beanbags hit the head. Chemical agents such as pepper spray and mace also form part of non-lethal-weapons. The chemicals are meant to create irritation on the suspect’s skin, eyes, and cause violent coughing. The police officers can then take control of the suspect after disorienting them with these chemicals (Dempsey and Forst, 2011). Technology Used In Policing Police officers have opted to use computing power and high-tech data transmission equipment to ensure that they collect, store, analyze and share data with other

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

African American Injustice Essay Example for Free

African American Injustice Essay â€Å"In the eyes of white Americans, being black encapsulates your identity. † In reading and researching the African American cultural group, this quote seemed to identify exactly the way the race continues to still be treated today after many injustices in the past. It is astonishing to me that African Americans can still stand to be treated differently in today’s society. In reading â€Å"Blacks in America†, Andrew Hacker states that â€Å"being black in America has consequences in areas of: wealth, identity, raising children, occupational opportunities, place of residence, and treatment in the criminal justice system. † To be honest, and I feel bad saying that I already knew this was happening to African Americans. I have heard stories of blacks not getting jobs; regardless of how qualified they are for the position, because of the color of their skin. I have heard stories, and even witness black children getting picked on in school because of the simple fact that they are black. I watched a video in school where a black family moved into a white neighborhood, and before long all the white families had moved out because they didn’t want a black family in their neighborhood. This was confirmed by Hacker in my research in the quote, â€Å"Almost all residential areas are entirely black or white. † I have also seen videos of African American men getting beaten by white arresting officers, and have heard stories of many black men being stereotyped by policemen. This must be why Hacker states â€Å"When white people hear the cry, â€Å"the police are coming! † it almost always means, â€Å"Help is on the way. † However blacks cannot make the same assumption. † These are all reports and events that I think the average American has seen before, but yet most people, including myself, continue to just shrug of and ignore. I guess it’s something that I might have subconsciously accepted, or maybe refused to think more deeply about. In reading and researching, I reaffirmed knowledge that I refused to take a greater note of. I wouldn’t say I learned anything new, because I knew what I wanted to focus on. A quote from Andrew Hacker’s article summarizes the above best, â€Å"In the eyes of white Americans, being black encapsulates your identity. † It may be easy to tell how I am going to focus this anthology. I am going to focus it on the injustices that African Americans continue to face in the United States today. That being, I know exactly what I need to get out of my interviewees, but it is probably a sensitive subject for some of the people I need to interview. I am not black, and I don’t know what it feels like to face this discrimination in everyday life. I can understand the tenderness that African Americans must feel then, when revealing and talking about their experiences with discrimination. I would think then, that it must be especially sensitive to talk about with a person from the race that they receive this everyday discrimination. It will be interesting to hear all the different types of prejudice that my interviewees have received throughout their lives. I would imagine that it ranges from just a look, or the way white Americans act around them, to voiced and physical altercations between themselves and white Americans. Hacker at times seems to be speaking directly to African Americans as he describes these altercations, â€Å"So many of the contacts you have with them (white Americans) are stiff and uneasy, hardly worth the effort. † But to me, that is exactly what the problem is. Why would it not be worth the effort? The first step to take for the uneasiness between the two races to cease to exist is for us (all people) to stop seeing color because once we act differently around the other is where all the problems seem to start. The second step is to make these contacts worth the effort. If we choose to continue to stay in our own comfortable circle of race, when is the problem ever going to end? The answer is never. My opinion as a white 18 year old is that most of the blame lies on the white race. Imagine being eyed every time you go into a store, having your car searched for no reason, or greeted warily at restaurants all because the color of your skin is different. We ignore this daily discrimination because no cares enough anymore to take notice that it happens every hour, every day somewhere in the United States. Will it ever stop? Not until we each take the steps to make it. A recent census commercial I’ve seen said â€Å"We (United States) can’t move forward until you mail it back. † I believe that our country can’t move forward and truly be great until we make sure these daily discriminations are eliminated from our society. In this project, I will interview African Americans on their personal experiences with discrimination, how they handle it, and if they think anything can be done about this problem. Sources: Andrew. 1999. Blacks in America. Pp. 160-168 in The Meaning of Sociology, 6th ed. , edited by Joel Charon. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. A Time to Kill. Dir. Joel Schumacher. 1996. African American History. University of Washington Libraries. Web. 02 Apr. 2010. .

Monday, January 20, 2020

Comparing Brave New World and Handmaids Tale :: comparison compare contrast essays

Comparison and Contrast between Brave New World and Handmaid's Tale The government in Huxley's Brave New World and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale, both use different methods of obtaining control over individuals, but are both similar in the fact that humans are looked at as instruments. Human's bodies, in both novels, are looked at as objects and not directly as living things with feelings. In both societies the individuals have very little and are controlled strictly by the government. In Handmaid's Tale and Brave New World, through issues of employment, class systems, and the control of reproduction, Atwood and Huxley forewarn that in an all-powerful society, it is destined to become corrupt. Both novels treat humans as items and not as human beings. In HMT, the entire structure of the Gilead society was built around the single goal of reproduction. Gilead is a society facing a crisis of radically dropping birthrates and to solve the problem it forces state control on the means of reproduction. Controlling women's bodies can succeed only by controlling the women themselves. The society's political order requires the overthrow of women. The government strips the women of the right to vote, the right to hold property or jobs and the right to read. The women's ovaries and womb become a `national resource' to the society. Women cease to be treated as individuals and rather as potential mothers. Women internalize the state created attitude even independent women like the narrator of HMT, Offred. At one point lying in a bathtub and looking at her naked form, Offred states; " I used to thin of my body as an instrument, of pleasure, or a means of transportation, or an implement for the accomplish of my will ... now the flesh arranges itself differently. I'm a cloud, congealed around a central object, the shape of a pear, which is hard and more real than I am and glows red within its translucent wrapping." Offred contrasts the way she used to think about her body to the way she thinks about it now. Before, her body was an instrument, an extension of herself. But now her self no longer matters and her body is only important because of its `central object', her womb which can bear a child.

Sunday, January 12, 2020

Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value

Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645 – 660 www. elsevier. com/locate/econbase Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate value J. R. Daviesa, David Hillierb,T, Patrick McColganc a University of Strathclyde, UK b University of Leeds, UK c University of Aberdeen, UK Received 21 November 2002; accepted 6 July 2004 Available online 20 April 2005 Abstract The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa. D 2005 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32 Keywords: Ownership structure; Capital expenditure; Corporate value; Tobin’s Q 1. Introduction In a market without agency problems, corporate managers will choose investments that maximise the wealth of shareholders. In practice, competing objectives which are incompatible with the shareholder wealth-maximising paradigm may also be pursued. T Corresponding author. Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Maurice Keyworth Building Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK. Tel. : +44 113 3434359; fax: +44 113 3434459. E-mail address: d. j. [email  protected] c. uk (D. Hillier). 0929-1199/$ – see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. doi:10. 1016/j. jcorpfin. 2004. 07. 001 646 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), a large literature has developed that examines how managerial behavior impacts upon firm performance. A vibrant strand of this literature concerns the relationship between managerial ownership levels, the direct investment decisions made by management and the inherent value of the firm, as proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio. Morck et al. 1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) provide evidence of a significant nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership. Specifically, value increases with managerial holdings for low levels of ownership. At some level, managers become entrenched within the firm resulting in a decrease in firm value. However, whereas Morck et al. (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document further changes in the corporate value–managerial holdings relationship at high levels of equity ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report no such change. Recent work has built upon the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argue that levels of managerial ownership will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) have shed doubt upon the earlier findings of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) by controlling for the effects of endogeneity and unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics in their analysis. After controlling for the effects of endogeneity in the corporate value– managerial holdings relationship, they showed that managerial ownership had little or no effect on corporate value and investment. Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) utilize a cubic specification to model the corporate value–managerial holdings relationship and both report a significant nonlinear functional form, similar to Morck et al. (1988), for British companies. However, neither study fully examines the misspecifying impact of endogeneity on their results. In this paper, we propose a new structure to the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship which captures a more complex characterisation of the evolving behavior of managers. We argue that at high levels of managerial ownership when external market discipline becomes neffective, there will be a resurgence of entrenchment behavior. With equity holdings around 50%, managers will have implicit control of their company, but still do not have objectives completely aligned to external shareholders. Only at very high levels of managerial holdings are incentives akin to other shareholders. When this model is applied to a l arge sample of firms incorporated in the UK, managerial ownership is seen to have a significant impact on corporate value. This relationship is endogenous, and consistent with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), corporate value has a corresponding effect on managerial holdings. We also find that although ownership levels are affected by firm level investment, there is no evidence of the reverse occurring. In the next section we outline our model of the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship. We present empirical results in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4. 2. The model In this section, we propose an alternative structure to the managerial holdings–corporate value relationship and argue that the cubic, or simpler representations, used in earlier J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 647 studies1 are unnecessarily restrictive and misspecified. The model that is presented here captures further nonlinearities in this relationship at high levels of managerial holdings and has a quintic specification. Management is faced with both negative and positive incentives to ensure that they follow objectives which maximise shareholder wealth. The effectiveness of these incentives is potentially a function of the level of managerial ownership in the firm. We view the propensity of management to maximise shareholder wealth to be a function of three unobserved factors: external market discipline, even if it is weak, internal controls and convergence of interests. Moreover, the strength of each factor can be viewed as a function of the level of managerial ownership in the firm. 2 2. 1. Low levels of managerial ownership For low levels of managerial ownership, external discipline and internal controls or incentives will dominate behavior (see Fama, 1980; Hart, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Empirically, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report results consistent with this behavior for the relationship between managerial holdings and corporate value. However, there is also the possibility that lower levels of ownership within this range have endogenously arisen from performance related compensation packages, such as stock options and stock grants rather than increased ownership in itself leading to higher Q ratios. 2. 2. Intermediate levels of managerial ownership At intermediate levels of managerial ownership, management interests begin to converge with those of shareholders. However, with greater ownership comes greater power in the form of voting rights. Managers may, at this level of holdings, maximise their personal wealth through increasing perquisites and guaranteeing their employment at the expense of corporate value. In addition, while low managerial ownership levels may have arisen through the vesting of compensation plans, it is unlikely that such plans will provide management with a moderate ownership stake in the firm. Moreover, even though external market controls are still in place, these and the effect of convergence of interests are not strong enough to align the behavior of management to shareholders. Managerial labour markets operate on the principal that poorly performing 1 See Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) for US companies and Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for UK companies. 2 For example, since compensation packages such as stock options are a transfer of wealth from shareholders to management, their value will lessen as managerial ownership increases. External market discipline is also a function of managerial ownership. Large shareholdings by top management act as a deterrent for takeovers because of the greater ability to oppose a hostile bid or drive up premiums to the point where bidders no longer view the target company as a positive net present value investment Stulz (1988). Finally, internal controls in the form of monitoring from large shareholders and corporate boards should reduce the scope for managers to diverge greatly from the interests of shareholders. Again, however, such discipline is likely to be inversely related to managerial control Denis et al. (1997). 648 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 anagers can be removed and appropriately disciplined. Studies by Denis et al. (1997) in the US and Dahya et al. (2002) in the UK both find an inverse relation between topmanagement turnover and managerial ownership. This lack of discipline provides evidence of a deficiency in incentives for managers to maximise shareholder value at this level of owners hip. Franks and Mayer (1996) also report that hostile takeover targets in the UK are not poorly performing firms, which is in contrast to the findings of a disciplinary role for corporate takeovers in the US by Martin and McConnell (1991). In this context, Franks and Mayer (1996) provide significant evidence that takeovers in the UK may not act to remove a self-serving board even when they are performing poorly. This lack of disciplinary control over poorly performing management may strengthen management’s ability to pursue sub-optimal corporate policies at intermediate ownership levels. 2. 3. High levels of managerial ownership (less than 50%) As levels of managerial equity ownership grow, objectives converge further to those of shareholders. At ownership levels, below 50% management do not have total control of the firm and external discipline still exists. While perhaps no longer being subject to any major discipline from external takeover markets, it is likely that even at these levels of ownership, managers are still subject to discipline from external block shareholders. This is particularly true in the UK, where because of strong informal ties between institutions (Short and Keasey, 1999), a lax regulatory environment concerning the ownership of listed companies (Roe, 1990) and low monitoring costs (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999), institutional activism is stronger than in the US. This view is also consistent with Franks et al. (2001) contention of strong minority protection laws in the UK, whereby large shareholders cannot transact with related companies without the consent of the firm’s minority shareholders. The UK regulatory framework stands in contrast to US corporate law which limits minorities to seeking redress after the related party transaction has taken place. Combined with monitoring from UK institutions, this may allo w external shareholders to impose some form of control on management even at elatively large levels of managerial ownership. 2. 4. High levels of managerial ownership (greater than 50%) At levels above 50% ownership, management has complete control of the company. Although atomistic shareholders are unlikely to have been able to in influence managers at far lower levels of ownership than this, there is always a possibility that a cartel of blockholders, allied with minority shareholder’s rights under UK company law, may be able to mount a challenge to management if they fail to make decisions in shareholders’ best interests. For a more in-depth discussion of the institutional differences and similarities between the United Kingdom and United States, see Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999). 3 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 649 At greater than 50% managerial ownership, this is no longer likely to be a serious issue to management. Furthermore, with majority ownership, the probability of a hostile takeover effectively becomes zero. The failure of external discipline combined with a lack of blockholder incentives above 50% may result in a decrease in corporate value for a small window of managerial holdings above this level. This fall in corporate value is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Stulz (1988). 2. 5. Very high levels of managerial ownership Finally, as managerial shareholdings rise to very high levels, management effectively become sole owners of the company. This would lead to value-maximising behavior as predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Consistent with Morck et al. 1988), Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at above a certain level of ownership, corporate managers are faced with such severe financial penalties for failing to maximise the value of their companies that they are forced to make decisions which will maximise firm value, regardless of how this affects their private benefits of control. 2. 6. Summary Our characterisation of a highly nonlinear relationshi p between managerial equity holdings and corporate value is in contrast to earlier studies (Morck et al. , 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al. 1999)4, which posit fewer turning points in their analysis. There is little theoretical basis on which the individual turning points can be determined, and the findings of Kole (1995) suggest that these will be in influenced by the size of the firms in the sample. However, it is expected that the second local maximum will be in the region of 50% managerial ownership reflecting the stage at which management gain total control of the company. In the next section, the main tests of our hypotheses will be carried out. 3. Empirical results 3. 1. Description of the data We use data on managerial and external block ownership for 1995 from the MacMillan London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. The Yearbook provides summary accounting data including a consolidated balance sheet, information on company directors, legal information on the company’s lawyers, auditors and stockbrokers, principle activities, company history, capital and dividend payments, and industrial sector for the McConnell and Servaes (1990) modelled the corporate value–managerial ownership relationship as a quadratic function, which by construction has only one turning point. 650 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 vast majority of all quoted companies and securities. 5 We restrict our attention to nonfinancial companies only and require that each firm has complete managerial and external ownership data for 1995, which leaves 802 industrial companies in our sample. 6 Data on capital expenditures, to tal assets employed, after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values, and research and development costs are collected from Datastream. We estimate Tobin’s Q ratio (our proxy for corporate value) using the formula below: Q? MVEQ ? PREF ? DEBT BV ASSETS ? 1? where: MVEQ=the year-end market value of the firm’s common stock; PREF=the yearend book value of the firmTs preference shares (preferred stock); DEBT=the year-end book value of the firmTs total debt; and BV ASSETS=the total assets employed by the firm, which is measured as total assets minus current liabilities. Our measure is consistent with the modified version of the formula as used by Chung and Pruitt (1994) who find that 96. 6% of the variability in the popular Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm of Tobin’s Q is explained by their approximation. Our method also avoids the data availability problems which arise from using the more rigorous algorithms proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) in order to estimate the replacement cost of assets. We use book values of preferred stock and long-term debt, rather than the market values proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997). In the UK, there is a far less active market for the trading of corporate debt than that which exists in the US, forcing us to rely on book values for these variables. In a final stratification of our sample, we mitigate the problem of potential outliers and trim 25 firms with the largest and smallest Tobin’s Q measure, leaving a final sample of 752 firms. 7 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample data. The mean managerial ownership stake of all board members is 13. 02%, which is similar to comparable US studies, but slightly lower than Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who report mean ownership of 16. 7%. Tobin’s Q is slightly higher than that reported for related US work with a mean value of 1. 96. The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q is 1. 21, which is also greater than other studies. However, it is substantially less than the mean of 2. 47 reported by Doukas et al. (2002) and is relatively similar to the mean value of 1. 86 that Short and Keasey (1999) report for their market valuation ratio. 8 The mean blockholder ownership is 37. 34% and is on a par with that reported for US firms by McConnell and Servaes (1990) (32. 4%) and 34. 57% reported by Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for UK firms. The full range of firm sizes is included in the sample with the 5 To establish the reliability of the summary ownership data, we carried out a correlation analysis of a subsample of 422 firms from he original data set of 802 companies (52. 62%) for which we were able to obtain company annual reports. The yearbook data and company accounts data exhibited a correlation of 0. 90, with a pvalue of 0. 00. We also establish the robustness of our data by re-estimating the model using data for 1997. This result is discussed later in this section. 6 Recently listed, merged or acquired firms are not included. 7 This is a larger sample than that used by Morck et al. (1988)—371 firms, Cho (1998)—326 firms and Himmelberg et al. (1999)—maximum 427 firms in any 1 year. Measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, minus any intangibles. J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 1 Descriptive statistics Variable Management ownership Blockholder ownership Largest stakeholder Capital expenditures Total assets employed After tax profits less depreciation/assets employed Debt/assets employed Market value of equity Research and development Tobin’s Q Mean 13. 02% 37. 34% 18. 82% 21,221 255,642 0. 1425 0. 1411 335 2918 1. 9647 S. D. 18. 06% 23. 57% 21. 64% 75,317 1,583,274 0. 4763 0. 252 1399 44,108 1. 2092 Minimum 0. 00% 0. 00% 0. 00% 7 268 A10. 977 0. 0000 0. 68 0 0. 4502 651 Maximum 79. 90% 100. 00% 100. 00% 1,024,200 37,774,000 3. 4207 4. 8358 26,224 1,198,988 7. 0997 Managerial own ership data measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder data measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3% of company’s outstanding equity. Capital expenditures (thousands), total assets employed (thousands), after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values (millions) and research and development costs (thousands) are collected from Datastream. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. mallest company having an equity market capitalization of o680,000 and the largest company’s equity valued at approximately o26 billion. The mean market capitalization of firms in the sample is o335 million. Table 2 provides the distribution of sample statistics grouped by managerial ownership. A very large proportion of the sample (62%) have managerial ownership levels less than or equal to 10%. However, a larg e fraction of companies (11%) also in the sample had boards Table 2 Breakdown of sample by managerial ownership Manager level Ownership Number of firms 464 87 75 41 34 26 21 4 Blockholder ownership, % 43. 34. 5 34. 4 24. 0 22. 7 13. 0 12. 7 5. 8 Tobin’s Q 1. 952 2. 033 1. 736 2. 109 2. 113 2. 257 1. 933 1. 808 Total assets employed 393,861 44,093 26,186 34,322 35,864 28,190 14,234 10,127 Capital expenditures/ assets employed 0. 106 0. 161 0. 124 0. 117 0. 114 0. 100 0. 099 0. 114 Liquidity 0. 130 0. 129 0. 157 0. 194 0. 194 0. 177 0. 169 0. 239 0VMOb10% 10VMOb20% 20VMOb30% 30VMOb40% 40VMOb50% 50VMOb60% 60VMOb70% 70VMOb100% Managerial ownership (MO) data measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder ownership measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Capital expenditure (thousands), total assets employed (thousands), after tax profits and equity market values (millions) are collected from Datastream. Liquidity is measured as cashflow divided by total assets employed. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. 652 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 3 Regression results for Tobin’s Q on managerial ownership Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Adj. R 2 Intercept 1. 85 28. 14 0. 017 MO 0. 12 3. 23 MO2 A0. 013 A3. 08 F MO3 4. 63A10 2. 82 2. 651 A4 MO4 A6. 73A10 A2. 53 A6 MO5 3. 36A10A8 2. 24 The following equation was estimated using data for 752 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1995. Q ? a0 ? a1 MO ? a2 MO2 ? a3 MO3 ? a4 MO4 ? a5 MO5 ? e where Q is Tobin’s Q and MO is managerial ownership. Ownership data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin’s Q is calculated from Datastream. which owned at least 40% of all outstanding equity. As would be expected, outside blockholder ownership decreases with managerial ownership. At managerial ownership levels of 30%, blockholder ownership is slightly less at 24%. It is probable that external discipline, as provided by blockholders, would still be strong at these levels of managerial holdings, particularly where informal coalitions among blockholders are more prominent (Short and Keasey, 1999). At higher levels of managerial holdings, blockholder ownership decreases sharply leading to a collapse in the power of blockholders. Managerial ownership is a decreasing function of company size, which is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Although firm sizes in the UK are considerably smaller than US firms, the ratios in Table 2 are similar to summary statistics provided in Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999). Table 2 also illustrates the nonlinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial holdings. Visual inspection indicates two maximum points in the region of 10% to 20% and 50% to 60%, respectively. The convergence of managerial interests to those of shareholders at very high levels of ownership is not apparent at this stage because of the small number of companies with managerial holdings above 70%. However, the statistics for all other groupings are consistent with our theoretical motivation. 3. 2. Estimation of ownership breakpoints In order to model the Tobin’s Q–managerial ownership (MO) function as having two maximum and two minimum turning points, we specify a quintic function, as follows: Q ? 0 ? a1 MO ? a2 MO2 ? a3 MO3 ? a4 MO4 ? a5 MO5 ? e ? 2? For the nonlinear relationship discussed in Section 2 to be valid, the coefficients in Eq. (2) must have the following signs: a 0N0; a 1N0; a 2b0; a 3N0; a 4b0; a 5N0. The estimated values of the coefficients in Eq. (2) are given in Table 3. 9 The intercept coefficient, which is an estimate of Tobin’s Q i n firms with no managerial holdings, is 1. 85. Each slope coefficient is of the correct sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. Although the It is clear that Tobin’s Q will be in influenced by more than just managerial ownership. However, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether the standard quadratic and cubic specifications used in previous studies are too simplistic. To maintain parsimony, we therefore omit other factors from this specific model. Other relevant factors are incorporated into the analysis in a later table. 9 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 653 Estimated Relationship between Tobin's Q and Managerial Ownership 2. 40 2. 20 2. 00 1. 80 1. 60 1. 40 1. 20 0 0. 1 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 5 0. 6 0. 7 0. 8 0. 9 Tobin's Q Insider Ownership Fig. 1. Estimated relationship between Tobin’s Q and Managerial Ownership. Tobin’s Q was modelled as a quintic function of insider ownership using ordinary least squares regression. The estimated regression line is: Q=1. 85+0. 12IOA0. 013OI2+4. 63A10A4IO3A6. 73A10A6IO4+3. 36A10A8IO5. adjusted R 2 is low, it is similar to that found in comparable US studies. The use of this model as a basis to estimate managerial ownership turning points leads to four critical values: 7. 01%, 26. 0%, 51. 4%, 75. 7% and is illustrated in Fig. 1. To establish the robustness of our regression model, the spline approach as applied by Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) to estimate breakpoints was carried out using our generated turning points. Table 4 presents the coefficients resulting from the piecewise linear regression. Similar to Table 3, each coefficient has the expected sign and all but one variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. The only variable that is not significant, MOover 76% , has the correct sign. The probable cause for the lack of significance is the small number of firms in this managerial ownership grouping. An examination of these results suggests that Tobin’s Q increases in firms for managerial ownership levels up to 7% and then declines to ownership levels of 26%. This is almost identical to the turning points in Morck et al. (1988) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) (5% and 25%, respectively) and is comparable to Cho (1998), who uses breakpoints of 7% and 38%. However, it differs from the UK studies of Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who each reports two turning points of 12. 99% and 41. 99%, and 19. 68% and 54. 12%, respectively. Earlier studies limited the turning points to two but in our extension, it is clear that there are another two turning points at much higher levels of managerial ownership. It also appears that market discipline has an influence on managerial objectives up to the point where the board takes complete control (51%). Tobin’s Q then decreases until ownership levels reach 76%, after which Q increases. Denis and Sarin (1999) argue that cross-sectional studies may be subject to bias, whereby they fail to account for events with potentially large valuation consequences. 10 10 Examples of such events may include receiving a takeover bid, top management turnover, etc. 654 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 4 Spline regression results for Tobin’s Q on managerial ownership Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Adj. R 2 Intercept 1. 854 28. 38 0. 012 MOup 0. 056 2. 93 to 7% MO7% to 26% MO26% 0. 0187 2. 57 2. 769 to 51% MO51% A0. 053 A1. 99 to 76% MOover 0. 624 1. 12 76% A0. 020 A2. 62 F The following equation was estimated using data for 752 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1995. Q ? a0 ? a1 MOup to 7% ? a2 MO7% to 26% a3 MO26% to 51% ? a4 MO51%to 76% ? a5 MOover 76% ?e where Q is Tobin’s Q and MOup to 7%=managerial ownership if managerial ownership b7%, =7% if managerial ownershipN7%. MO7% to 26%=0 if managerial ownership b7%, =managerial ownership minus 7% if 7%bmanagerial ownershipb26%, =26% if managerial ownershipN26%. MO26% to 51%=0 if managerial ownershipb26%, =managerial ownership m inus 26% if 26%bmanagerial ownershipb51%, =51% if managerial ownershipN51%. MO51% to 76%=0 if managerial ownership b51%, =managerial ownership minus 51% if 51%bmanagerial ownershipb76%, =76% if managerial ownership N26%. MOover 76%=0 if managerial ownershipb76%, =managerial ownership minus 76% if managerial ownershipN76%. Ownership data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin’s Q is calculated from Datastream. As a further test of robustness, we carried out the quintic analysis for managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q for the same sample of available firms in 1997. 11 Again, each coefficient was significant with the correct signs and the turning points from the estimated model were relatively stable at 7. 9%, 26. 5%, 55. 2% and 86. 2%. . 3. Endogeneity of managerial equity ownership, investment and corporate value To analyse the effects of endogeneity in the managerial ownership, investment and corporate value relationship, we follow Cho (1998) and carry out a simultaneous equations analysis using two-stage least squares. Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) showed that once endogeneity was controlled, the perceived impact of managerial ownership on corporate value d isappeared. Moreover, corporate value was found to positively affect levels of managerial ownership. It is possible that if the model specification employed by these studies is wrong, what appears to be a lack of statistical significance in the endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations analysis may actually be due to errors in variables arising from the intermediate regressions. We re-run the two-stage least squares analysis of Cho (1998) using our more complex specification. 12 The control variables in our regression are the same as in Cho (1998). Namely, managerial ownership, investment and corporate value are Some firms fell out of the sample because of mergers, delisting, and being taken over. Cho (1998) also attempts to control for specification error by re-estimating his simultaneous regression analysis using managerial ownership as a linear variable and again finds no relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. However, if indeed there is a nonlinear relationship between ownership and corporate value, such an approach would fail to capture this. 12 11 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 655 defined to be endogenously determined by each other as well as some additional relevant exogenous variables. That is: Managerial Ownership ? ? market value of firm0s common equity; corporate value; investment; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? Corporate Value ? g? managerial ownership; investment; leverage; asset size; industry; block ownership; largest stakeholder? Investment ? h? managerial ownership; corporate value; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? For comparability, we define each of the above vari ables as in Cho (1998). For each company, industry dummy variables are set equal to one for each Financial Times Industry Classification (FTIC) grouping that sample firms lie within, and zero otherwise. In addition to the variables used by Cho (1998), we include blockholder ownership and largest stakeholder in the corporate value regressions to reflect the potential impact of blockholder discipline in the UK and the role of a founding or dominant individual on corporate value. All accounting and market variables are taken at the financial year-end from Datastream. In Table 5, we report results from the simultaneous equations analysis. Taking the managerial ownership regression first, all variables with the exception of investment have coefficients with the expected sign. Managerial ownership is negatively related to the market value of equity, which reflects the fact that wealth constraints and risk-aversion will prevent managers from holding substantial stakes in large firms. Firm level liquidity is shown to be positively related to managerial ownership, which is a stronger result than Cho (1998) who reported no significance for this variable. Importantly, Tobin’s Q is found to be significant and positively related to the level of managerial ownership. This is consistent with Cho (1998) but is opposed to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), who find the opposite effect. This result suggests that managers tend to hold larger stakes in firms that are successful or have higher corporate value. This may also be indicative of successful managers benefiting from equity-related compensation policies. The investment variable, which has a negative impact on managerial ownership is surprising as theory predicts that firm level investment will be positively related to managerial ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) contend that firms with high investment spending will have high managerial ownership to alleviate the monitoring problem caused by discretionary managerial spending. However, Jensen (1986) argued that firms may overinvest as a result of an earnings retention conflict, rather than underinvest as Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) moral hazard theory would predict. When a firm is in this situation, managers may be able to maximise their size-related compensation by overinvesting, but are aware that this may ultimately reduce the value of their shareholdings. Although tentative, this could in part explain the negative relation between investment and ownership. Cho (1998) also finds a negative (but insignificant) coefficient on the investment variable using both capital and research and development expenditures. 56 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 5 Simultaneous equations analysis of managerial ownership, corporate value and investment Variable MVEQ Tobin’s Q Volatility Liquidity Investment Leverage Asset size Largest stakeholder Blockholder ownership MO MO2 MO3 MO4 MO5 Industry dummies Adj. R 2 F Managerial ownership A1. 8A10 (A3. 74) 0. 127 (4. 63) A1. 0A10A6 (A0. 74) 0. 035 (2. 24) A1. 314 (A2. 67) A5 Corporate value Investment 0. 073 (2. 35) 3. 89A10A6 (A2. 86) 0. 013 (1. 01) Yes 0. 045 8. 014 5. 136 (2. 23) 1. 088 (4. 36) 3. 33A10A8 (1. 17) A0. 20 (A0. 06) A0. 837 (A2. 60) 1. 588 (3. 07) A0. 395 (A2. 22) 0. 037 (1. 64) A0. 001 (A1. 14) 1. 9A10A5 (0. 76) Yes 0. 033 3. 497 A0. 035 (A0. 46) 0. 018 (0. 72) A0. 003 (A0. 92) 1. 72A10A4 (1. 03) A3. 12A10A7 (A1. 07) Yes 0. 009 2. 497 Results from a simultaneous equations analysis of managerial ownership, corporate value and investment for 752 firms, using the two-stage least squares method to estimate the following equations: Managerial Ownership ? f ? market value of firm0s common equity; corporate value; investment; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? CorporateValue ? g? anagerial ownership; investment; financial leverage; asset size; industry; block ownership; largest stakeholder? Investment ? h? managerial owner ship; corporate value; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? In the above equations, managerial ownership measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder data measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3% of company’s outstanding equity. Investment is defined as capital expenditure divided by total assets employed, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets employed and liquidity is measured as cashflow divided by total assets employed. Capital expenditure, total assets employed, after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values and profit volatilities are collected from Datastream. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. t-Statistics are in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients from the corporate value regression are given in the second column of Table 5. Corporate value is shown to be positively related to investment and leverage. While the investment coefficient is as expected, the sign of the leverage variable requires more discussion. Morck et al. 1988) find that leverage has a negative but insignificant impact on corporate value and attribute this to the possibility of managers in highly levered firms holding a higher than average level of ownership. However consistent with our results, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a positive significant coefficient for leverage. Leverage can have various effects on firm value. The notion that high debt levels lead to greater corporate value has been argued by Modigliani and Miller (196 3) with respect J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 57 to valuable tax shields, Ross (1977) and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling hypothesis and Jensen’s (1986) free cashflow hypothesis. Ultimately, leverage is one way of imposing external discipline on management and if it is effective, will lead to increased corporate value. Alternatively, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) interpret a negative association between leverage and firm value as being due to relative inflation between the current time period and the earlier time period where companies had issued much of their debt. We view the most important result from the corporate value regression as being the significance of the managerial ownership variables. Our results indicate that although managerial ownership levels are determined by corporate value, corporate value itself is determined in part by managerial ownership. This finding is at odds with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) but consistent with the classical view of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and empirical work by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). An interesting result is that blockholder ownership is shown to negatively impact Tobin’s Q. This result is consistent with Faccio and Lasfer (1999, 2000). McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that this could be due to a conflict of interests, which results from blockholders being forced into aligning themselves with managers so as not to jeopardize their other dealings with the firm. Alternatively, the negative coefficient may be explained by the strategic alignment hypothesis, which argues that blockholders and managers find it mutually beneficial to cooperate with each other. Finally, such findings may be consistent with the arguments of Burkart et al. 1997) in that too much block ownership will overly constrain management and reduce their ability to take value-maximising investment decisions. The investment regression coefficients presented in column three of Table 5 show a significant positive effect of corporate value on investment and a negative effect of profit volatility on investment. The finding that corporate value has a positive effect on investment is consisten t with the arguments of Cho (1998) that highly valued firms will have large investment opportunities. Also, firms with variable earnings will be reluctant to invest if future income is uncertain. Managerial ownership is found to have no impact on firm level investment. However, this may reflect optimality in that investment policy may be one way in which managers affect value, but not the only means. Ultimately we view our findings of a causal relation between ownership and firm value as being of greater significance than the lack of a relation between ownership and investment. These results are consistent with Cho (1998) but slightly stronger, in that volatility of earnings is significant in our regressions but insignificant in Cho (1998). . Conclusions Debate as to the relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership in the US is still unresolved. Studies such as Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document a nonlinear relation between these two variables. More recent work by Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) shows that when controlling for endogeneity, managerial ownership is determined by corporate value but not vice-versa. 658 J. R. Davies et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 We argue that even accepting that corporate value and managerial ownership are endogenously related to each other, misspecification of the managerial holding–corporate value relationship may lead to spurious conclusions concerning the direction of causality. Applying a quintic structure, we present results which suggest that the correct form of this relationship is a double humped curve. This is in contrast to other studies that have assumed a cubic or quadratic specification and by construction only one hump. The second hump or local maximum is attributed to a collapse in external market discipline at or around the point where managers take overall control of their firm. At this point, which is around 50% ownership, the management is not sufficiently akin to owners but have sufficient power to disregard any form of external monitoring or discipline. This has a detrimental affect on corporate value for a short window of managerial holdings. At high levels of managerial ownership, managers are effectively majority owners of their firm leading to a convergence of interests with other outside shareholders. Utilizing the quintic specification for managerial ownership, we show that even when controlling for endogeneity, not only is corporate value a determinant of managerial ownership but managerial ownership is also a determinant of corporate value. This finding is consistent with the classical work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), as well as the early empirical work of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) who do not control for endogeneity in their analysis of corporate value and managerial ownership. We believe our analysis to have several important contributions to the literature on the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. First, our quintic specification extends previous work in this area and successfully captures the complex nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership. Second, by analysing a completely different market which is similar in structure to the United States, we strengthen the power and insights gained from earlier comparable US studies. Third, we provide evidence that corporate value, firm level investment and managerial holdings are interdependent with each other. This has implications for the debate on the effectiveness of compensation policies involving stock options for top managers. Moreover, our findings suggest that some levels of managerial ownership may not be beneficial to outside shareholders even when these levels are high. At the very least, this paper has served to add to the debate concerning the importance of managerial ownership on corporate value by providing evidence that even controlling for endogenous effects, managerial ownership and stock compensation schemes do have a significant influence on corporate value. Our research has provided an initial step towards a more accurate characterisation of the corporate value–managerial ownership relationship. While we do not posit that our specification can be applied to every given data set, we argue that previous research may be misspecified where it has failed to fully explore alternative specifications of the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship. Future work in this area may focus on other structural forms, which more effectively reflect the interdependence of managerial ownership and corporate prospects. 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